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ABSTRACT•
This paper considers two alternativeapproaches to stabilizing an economy with
firm—specificproductivity disturbances. The first useswage contracts tying
wages in each firm to these disturbances as well as theprice level. The
second uses a tax on firms which modifies theirsupply behavior together with
a simple waqe indexation rule tyingwages to prices alone. Both these schemes
are viable as long as the firm-specific disturbanceis known to all agents.
If the firm alone observes theproductivity disturbance, under either scheme
it has an incentive to misrepresentcurrent conditions. However, a
combination of these two schemes is both welfaremaximizing and incentive
compatible.
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Wage indexation offers one solution to stabilizing aneconomy with labor
contracts which fix wages on the basis of lagged information.Beginning with
the contributions of Gray (1976) and Fischer(1977), a number of studies have
examined how wages might be adjusted to current informationin such a way as
to replicate a full information, frictionlesseconomy-—one without wage
contracts. The objective of the indexation scheme, ineffect, is to undo the
rigidities due to the contracts. One of the main conclusionsof this
literature is that indexation of wages to prices is ingeneral incapable of
replicating a frictionless economy. Full wage indexation to thedomestic
price level will stabilize the economy againstmonetary disturbances, but may
accentuate the destabilizing effects of real disturbances. Theoptimal degree
of indexation, which depends upon the relativeimportance of real and monetary
disturbances, can at best minimize but not eliminate undesirablevariations of
output.
Recent studies, however, have shown how it is possible formore complex
forms of wage indexation to replicate exactlya frictionless economy. Karni
(1983), for example, demonstrates that if thewage is indexed not only to
current prices, but also to current aggregate output, then it isindeed
possible to stabilize the economy perfectly relative to the frictionless
economy.1 The scheme, however, requires thatinformation on aggregate output,
the crucial variable to be stabilized, be availablevirtually instantaneously,
or at least within the time interval envisaged by the model. Suchan
assumption may be reasonable if every firm in theeconomy is subject to the
same productivity disturbances, since then each firm would be ableto infer
the size of the aggregate disturbances from thoseoccurring at the individual
firm level. But if the productivity disturbancesare at least partially firm—specific, then the observations of any onefirm give only partial information
about the aggregate disturbances. Moreover,if labor is less than perfectly
mobile between firms during the current period,then information about firm—
specific disturbances, rather than just aggregatedisturbances, must be
incorporated in the indexation rule since wagesin a competitive economy will
vary from one firm to another.
In this paper we offer two alternative approachesto stabilizing an
economy subject to firm—specific disturbances.One approach relies on
privately-negotiated wage contracts which tie wagesin each firm to firm—
specific variables, as well as to the pricelevel. This indexation rule is
analogousto Karni 's rule, except that the wage rate istied to the output of
the individual firm, or equivalently1 to firm-specificdisturbances, rather
thanto the aggregate output level.
As an alternative, we propose a taxation schemeto accompany a wage
indexation rule tying wages to prices alone. Like themorecomplex indexation
scheme, this combination of taxation and indexationenables the contract
economy to replicate output in the competitive,full information economy. The
tax is a levy on the net revenue of the firmwith a corresponding taxcredit
for the employment of labor. It is designed to reducethe response of the
firm's demand for labor to changes in prices or productivitydisturbances,
thereby mimicking the firm's output behavior in acompetitive benchmark
economy. The essential feature of the taxisthat it makes use of firm—
specific information, by inducing firms to modifytheir labor use in response
to a productivity disturbance, but does not requirethat wages be tied to any
firm—specific information.
Both of these schemes are viable as long as the firm—specificdisturbance
is known to all agents, including labor and the government, aswell as
—2—firms. There is no particular need for the tax scheme in this case of
symmetric information since the privately-negotiated wage contract described
above is able to replicate the competitive, full informationeconomy. If the
firmaloneobserves the productivity disturbance, however, then the taxscheme
plays a role in making the privately—negotiated contract incentive-.
compatible.With asymmetric information, the firm has an incentive to
misrepresent current economic conditions. By doing so, it can reduce itswage
bill in the case of the indexation scheme or reduce its taxliability in the
case of the tax scheme. But, as we show below, a combination of the tax
scheme with the privately-negotiated contract not only succeeds inreplicating
output in the competitive, full information economy, but also eliminates the
incentive on the part of firms to misrepresent. This incentive—compatible
scheme involves wage indexation to both the price level and the firm—specific
disturbance coupled with an appropriate taxation scheme on the firm'srevenue.
In the case where the productivity disturbance is known only to firms,
departures from Pareto optimality can occur due to the incompleteness of
private markets. It is this which creates the potential for welfare—improving
government intervention. While our analysis shows that a tax scheme can
improve welfare relative to an initial (incomplete) market situation, it sheds
no light on why markets are incomplete. Nor does our analysis explain why the
government has any advantage in improving welfare, since it does not explore
purely private contract schemes which might also restore the competitive
solution •2
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes
a benchmark competitive economy, paying particular attention to the underlying
microeconomjc structure. The contract economy is discussed in Section 3. The
two partial schemes are discussed in Section 4, while the incentive-compatible
—3—scheme is derived and discussed in Section 5. Ourconclusions are given in
Section 6. The analysis can be thought of as applyingeither to a closed
economy or toa small open economy operatingin a world in which domestic and
foreign goods are perfect substitutes. Only a modestmodification is required
to extend the results to an open economy in whichdomestic and foreign goods
are imperfect substitutes.
2. A BENCHMARK COMPETITIVE BONOMY
We consider an economy consisting of K firms, each ofwhich produces an
identical good by means of a Cobb-Douglas production functionof the form
Y =(L)e (1)
and L represent the output and labor used by each firm,while v is a
productivity disturbance, which is assumed to be firm specific.We assume
that the firm can observe its own current output and cantherefore observe the
value of the disturbance v when it occurs. ThroughoutSections 2—4, v is
also assumed to be known to the labor employed by the firmand the government.
In Section 5 we assume that it is known only to the firmand discuss the moral
hazard problems this raises. In the absence of disturbances,the output of
the representative firm is
Y =(L1)10 (1')
where the subscript o denotes the stationary equilibrium. Linearizingthe
production function (1) about the stationary level (1') weobtain an
expression for the percentage change in output as afunction of the percentage
change in labor and the productivitydisturbance3
—4—y (1 — + v , (2)
where y (y —Y1)/Y1, (L
-L1)/L',denote percentage changes.
We assume that workers are mobile betweenfirms from one period to
another, so the wage paid in the stationaryequilibriu (where disturbances
are absent) is the same across firms. We
assume, however, that because of the
significant costs of moving between firms, workersare immobile within the
period, so wages can vary from firm to firmex post once the supply
disturbances are revealed to the firm. We believethis assumption is
preferable to the usual one of perfectmobility between firms, which in the
presence of firm—specific disturbances requiresan unrealistic degree of
interfjrm mobility within every period.4
Inan economy with spot labor markets, but with labortied in the current
period to individual firms, each firm has an incentiveto exercise monopsony
power over its labor. So the equilibriuni attainedby such an economy will
not, in general, be Pareto optimal. The benchmarkequilibrium to be used for
welfare comparisons, however, should be that ofan economy where both firms
and labor behave competitively. So theequilibrium we describe below is one
in which each firm behaves as if itwere competitive in the labor market.5
Later we shall describe indexationcum_taxatjonschemes which achieve this
same Pareto optimal equilibriu.
Assuming that the representative firm behavescompetitively, profit
maximization yields the following labor demand functionexpressed in terms of
percentage changes:
i 1 iii —w)+— v' (3)
where p, w denote the percentagechanges in the price of output and the
firm—specific wage, respectively. The supply oflabor, which is tied to the
—5—firm within the period, is given by
=n(w
— 'fl> 0. (4)
Equating (3) and (4) yields the reducedform expressions for the










where *denotesthe benchmark economy. The percentage changein these real
variables is a function of the firm—specific productivitydisturbance, but is
independent of any demand disturbance,insofar as these operate through the
nominal price level.





In stationary equilibrium, all firms producethe same output using the same
amount of labor and paying the same wage:
i i i Y =Y/K,L =L/K, W =W
00 0 0 0 0
Inan economy with supply disturbances, however,total output is a function of
the aggregate supply disturbance. In percentage terms,the aggregate supply
disturbance can be expressed as an average of thefirm—specific
disturbances, v = Ev. Each firm—specific disturbance,in turn, can be
decomposed into the common aggregate disturbanceand a firm—specific
—6—Component, e
K. 1 1 1 Vt =v+e
' = 0. (7)
1=1
Bothv and e have means of zero and are serially uncorrelated,as well as
uncorre].ated with one another. Aggregate
employment, aggregate output, and
the average wage are obtained by
summing the corresponding expressions for the
firm (5a—5c) over the K firms. Each ofthe variables is expressed belowas a
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The behavior of the real and nominalvariables in this economy will be
used as a benchmark for the comparison withthe contract economy to be
introduced below. Before turning to thelatter, however, we shall illustrate
the adjustment of realwages and employment to a productivity shock in the
benchmark economy. Figure 1 illustrates thecase of a positive shock,
> 0. The labor supply curve is unaffectedby this shock, while the labor
demand curve shifts up in proportion to thedisturbance (to L). As a
result, the level of employment and the level ofthe real wage both rise as
follows
i* i Lt =L[1÷ (nv)/(1 +nO)] (9)
W/P* =(W1/P)[1÷ v/(1 +no)]
• (10)
—7—1* i*
Theseequations are obtained bysubstituting the valuesof and w -








Forthe contract economy described below, weshall specify wage indexation and
taxation systems which will replicate theemployment behavior of this
economy. The wage rate willbehave differently in the contract economyunder
the taxation scheme. However, an appropriate
redistribution of the tax
revenues will ensure that thebehavior of total wage income in the two
economies is identical.
3. CONTRACT EXONOMY
The economy we wish to analyze differsfrom the benchmark economy
described in the previous section in one
crucial respect. The wage is set in
a contract at the beginning ofthe period, before any disturbances are
known. Asin othercontract models, this contract wageis chosen so as to
clearthe market at the price expected atthe beginning of period t, on the
basisof previous information.
Because of the existence of contract lags,the nominal wage rate is
assumed to be indexed to variables knowncurrently. To reduce (and perhaps
eliminate) variations in real wages, nominal wagesare indexed to the price
level, p.. Since wages are firm—Specific,however, they may be indexed to
firm—specific variables as well as economy—widevariables. For the wage paid
to workers in firm i, the obviouscandidate is the output of firm i or,
equivalentlY1 the productivity disturbanceof firm i, v, which is observable
to firm i. So the indexation rulewill take the form:
—8—w=w+b1(p_Ep) +b2v, (11)
wherewdenotes the (economy—wide) contractwage determined at the beginning
ofperiodt and Et_ipt denotes the expectedprice level based on information
availablein the previous period, t-1. Theparameters b1, b2 describe the
proportionaldegree of indexation.
As an alternative to this indexation rule,we offer a taxonthe firm
which makes use of firm-specific information.Our choice of such a taxation
scheme is governed by the need to affectsupply behavior directly so as to
modify the individual firms response toproductivity disturbances. Each firm
in the economy is subject to a marginal taxon its gross revenuesPt +y,at
a rate ,witha corresponding tax credit for the laboremployed by the
firm. If T is the total tax collected fromfirm i, then the deviation in the
taxabout that in the initial equilibriumcan beexpressed as a percentage of
thegross revenue of the firminstationary equilibrium as follows:
t°=[p+ y -(1-e)J . (12)
Equation (12) provides the mostconvenientspecification of the tax. Its
statementin level form is given in the Appendix. Withthis tax, the change
in the net profit of the firm, R, isgiven (in deviation form) by
t0 1 1 1 1 =(1 -8"Pt++ (1- - 1-
O)(wt+£)
. (13) py00
If=0,the net profit function is the same as in thebenchmark economy.
But withnon—zero, the tax provides a lever for modifying theoutput
behaviorof the firm in response to a current disturbance.6
—9—The tax modifies the response of labordemand to a productivity increase.
As shown in the Appendix, maximizingnet profit yields the labor demand
function
=(1- - w/Q+ (1 -)v/O
, (14)
which implies the corresponding aggregatelabor demand function
(1 - - w/Q+ (1 - . (15)
A rise in productivity in firmi(v > 0) increases the demand for labor,the
magnitude of the response depending uponthe marginal taxrate.When
=0,the demand for labor shifts just as much inthe contract economy as in
the benchmark economy; cf (3) and (14). Employmentmust rise more in the
contract economy than in the benchmark economy.This is because wages are
fixed in the former, whereas they respond tothe increase in labor demand in
the latter (as long as labor supply is positivelysloped). When> 0 the
demand for labor responds less to a productivityincrease than in the
benchmark economy. With the correct marginal tax rate,in fact, the demand
for labor shifts just enough to achieve the same employmentlevel as in the
benchmark economy.
To obtain the contract wage, we equate aggregatelabor demand (equation
(15)) with an aggregate version of the labor supplyequation (4), to express
w as a function of Pt and vt.The contract wage is then equal to the





The conditional expectation of the price level depends uponthe nature of the
underlying stochastic disturbances which current pricemovements reflect. We
shall assume that these disturbances are white noise,in which case E p t—1 t






which ties the wage to the price (both expressed as percentage changes) and
the supply disturbance.
Outputof the i-th firm in the contract economy can beobtained by






According to this expression, output is a function of current prices as well
as the productivity disturbance, with the coefficients of t and being
functions of the indexation and tax parameters. To determine theoptimal
indexationand taxation parameters, we shall compare the output in this
economy with that in the benchmark economy. More specifically, we shall





Substituting(17) and (5b) into (18), we obtain
= — B—bi)p+ — (÷b2)]v'] . (19)
Appropriate choices of the policy parameters b1, b2, and B will ensure that
the coefficients of t andare equal to zero, so that the output foreach
firmin the contract economy matches that in the benchmark economy. (As a
—11—result, aggregate output must be identical in the twoeconomies.)The
appropriate values satisfy the relationships
b1 += 1, (20a)
b += . (20b)
2 1+nQ
Itis an immediate consequence of these equations that there is an extra
degree of freedom with respect to the choice of the optimal policy
parameters. One of them canbe setarbitrarily; the other two are then
determineduniquely by these two relationships. The two most natural cases to
consider are where (i) wage indexation alone is available to stabilize the
economy (= 0)and(ii)taxationis used to supplement wage indexation to
pricesalone (b2 =0).We shall discuss these in turn.
A. Stabilization Through Wage Indexation Alone
Setting=0in (20a), (20b), we immediately obtain
b1 =1 , (20a)
b2 =1/(1÷ n) , (20b')
vi
i t
so that w =++ n
• (21)
That is, the wage rate should be fully indexed to the price level, but only
partially to the productivity disturbance. It is easy to understand why this
rule replicates the behavior of the frictionless economy. It keeps the
indexed wage equal to the wage found in the benchmark economy; c.f. (21) and
(5c)
By making use of both price and production information, (21) is analogous
to the rule recently proposed by Karni. (1983) for a closed economy. In a
—12—model with economy—wide disturbances, Karni proposed indexing the (economy-
wide) wage to-the level of aggregate output, which is assumed to be publicly
known, as well as the price level. In his model, such an indexation rule
eliminates all variations of aggregate output relative to that of the
benchmark economy because it duplicates the wage in such an economy. The same
argument applies here, except that we must tie the firm—specific wage to the
firm—specific output, or equivalently, to the firm-specific disturbance as in
(21)
B. Stabilization Through Indexation and Taxation
The indexation rule (21) gives rise to wage rates which are firm—
specific. Yet in many economies where wage indexation is practiced, the wage
is tied to some common price index, so that the indexation is uniform across
industries. This is the case, for example, in Australia. Thus as an
alternative to indexation based on firm-specific disturbances, in this section
we consider a tax scheme which, when combined with iridexation of wages to
prices alone, induces firms to produce at the same levels as in the benchmark
economy. The tax specified in Section 3 is levied on the individual firm.
Each firm makes its production decision based on the tax rate and the wage
rate which is tied through indexation to the price level alone. The
indexation parameter, b2, is therefore set to zero, so that the wage rate is
identical for all firms.
The optimal taxation and indexation parameters are obtained from (20a)
and (20b) for the case where b2 =0:
b1 =1—= nO/[1+nO) , (20a")
=1/[1+n) . (20b')
Choosingthose values of the parameters, the coefficients of p and in (19)
—13—are both equal to zero and so output in the contract economy must replicate
that inthebenchmark, Pareto optimal economy.
Theexpressions for the optimal pair of taxation and indexation
parameters are simple, depending upon only the supply elasticity of labor, n,
and the elasticity of labor in the production function, and being independent
of the stochastic structure of the economy. Notice that the taxation
parameterranges from one to zero as thelabor supply elasticity varies from
zeroto infinity. The wageindexation parameter in turn varies from zero to
one. In general, partialwageindexation is optimal. Full indexation is
optimal only in the limiting case where labor supply is infinitely elastic.
Given the optimal taxandindexation parameters, the values of the other
endogenous parameters can be derived, Substituting for the optimalinto
(17),output is given by
i1+n i y =1 v . (22) t i +no)t
Also,with w' =Etipt =0,the money wage (identical for all firms)




and substituting this expression into (14), employment is determined by
=( +n0)V't
• (24)
Notice that both (22) and (24) are identical to their counterparts in the
benchmark economy (equations (5b) and (5a), respectively). By contrast, the
money wage, being tied directly to the price level, does not replicate that of
thebenchmarkeconomy.
-14—To explain how the combined system of indexation and taxation modifies
behavior in this economy, we focuson the wage and labor demand equations.
Belowwe express both equations in terms of the level of the real wage by












Itis evident from the form of these two equationsthat as long as=1-b1,
arisein the price level has no effect on employment since the real wage
rises or falls by the same amount in both equations. Thus a monetary
disturbance, which affects the labor market only through prices, leaves
employment, and therefore output, unchanged. Observe that the real wage is
affected, a point to which we shall return below.
Productivity disturbances have two-fold effects on the labor market
facing individual firms. To the extent that an increase in productivity is
economy-wide (Vt> 0),the wage and labor demand equations must both shift in
proportion to the resulting change in the price level. (The price level
falls, although the magnitude of the price adjustment cannot be determined
without introducing a demand side of the economy.) To the extent that the
firm itself experiences an increase in productivity (v =e> 0), in
contrast, the labor demand curve alone is affected, shifting horizontally by
i(1—B) i n i = v= v . (27) t 0 t (1+n) t
—15—In Figure 1, we illustrate this adjustment to the firm—specificdisturbance
for the case where only this firm experienceSa disturbance. An increasein
productivity confined to firm i leaves the price level constant sothe wage is




In the previous sections we have assumed that the firm—specific
productivity disturbances are observed by all the agents in the economy.
Under this assumption either of the two schemes we have been discussing will
succeed in replicating output in the benchmark economy perfectly. In this
section we consider what happens when the firm alone observes its productivity
disturbance. We first show that the firm has an incentive to misrepresent
current conditions, in order to reduce its wage bill in the case of the
indexation scheme,9 or to reduce its tax liability in the case of the tax
scheme. We then show how a combination of the two schemes is incentive—
compatible by which we mean that there is no incentive on the part of thefirm
to misrepresent the true disturbance.1°
We begin by illustrating the incentive to misrepresent a firm-specific
rise in productivity in firm i (v =e).
We do this by comparing the profits
to the firm obtained by revealing the truth (which we call 'full disclosure')
with those obtained by not revealing the disturbance (which we label
'cheating'), Let the firm's net (after—tax) profits be written as a
percentage change from their stationary value as =(R
-R1)/R1.Using the
expression (A.6) for -R1developed in the appendix and substituting into
that expression the wage indexation rule (11'), we obtain the following
expression for profit in the case of full disclosure
—16—1 1 i I i I
11t full disclosure
— + + —e)i. - (1-)(w÷
={- +v) -(1-o)(b1p+ b2v)} . (28)
If the firm announces its productivity disturbance, then it must pay a higher
tax, or pay its workers a higher wage, b2v, depending upon whether the
tax or the firm—specific wage indexation scheme is in effect.If, on the
other hand, the firm decides not to reveal the disturbance, it can avoid the




The gain in profits from cheating is therefore
tcheating llttfulldisclosure= {+ O)b2}v
. (30)
Itis clear that as long as the productivity disturbance is positive, there is
an incentive not to announce productivity gains, whether thetax(at the rate
or the firm-specific indexation scheme (with indexatiori parameter b2) is in
effect.11By the same reasoning, if the rise in productivity is economy-wide
(v =vt),then the firm will have an incentive to claim that the resulting
fall in prices is due to disturbances elsewhere in the economy. A firm could
claim, for example, that prices have fallen because of productivity
disturbances confined to other firms.
Since labor should be aware of these incentives to misrepresent, it will
be reluctant to enter into an indexation scheme of this type unless there is
some provision for monitoring the firm's productivity. Monitoring, in fact,
is sometimes found in profit-sharing schemes in the United States, where labor
is allowed to bring in independent auditors to verify a firm's profit
figures. Similarly, the government is unlikely to establish a tax scheme
—17—unless some monitoring of the firm is possible. In either case, evenif
monitoring is-feasible, it is likely to be costly to the economy.Thus as an
alternative to these schemes which require surveillance, we now propose a
modification of the tax and indexation rules which eliminates theincentive to
cheat on the part of the firm. The necessary modification is suggested by
(30) above. Specifically, we need to combine the tax andindexation schemes
and to convert the tax into a subsidy (<0),so that
——(1—)b2
< 0 , (31)
in which case the gain from misrepresenting current conditions iseliminated
entirely.
Ofcourse we still require the indexation and taxation parametersto
replicate the benchmark economy. Thus the combinationof b1, b2, and ,which
satisfy(20a), (20b), as well as (31)will succeed both in achieving the
stabilization objective and in inducing firms to reveal the truth. The unique
set of indexation and tax parameters which satisfies all threeconditions
(20a), (20b), and (31) is given by
b =1+
1 —0> 1, (32a)
1 0(1 + no)
b=





Since (20a) and (20b) are satisfied, all deviations of output from thatin the
benchmark economy are eliminated. And since (31) is satisfied, there is no
incentive on the part of firms to misrepresent current conditions.
There are two features of this combined taxation and indexation scheme
which require further discussion. First, the indexation parameter for prices
—18—(b1) is greater than unity so that wages are indexed more thanproportionally
to prices. Second, the combined scheme does notnecessarily duplicate the
income distribution found in the benchmarkeconomy. However, by the
appropriate choice of a lump sum tax to finance the subsidy tofirms, we can
ensure that after-tax wage income is proportional to prices, rather thanbeing
over—indexed,and that the after-tax income distribution is identicalto that
ofthe benchmark economy, at least at the aggregate level. Thesubsidy to
firms must be financed by a lump sum tax on labor and firmsproportional to
theirshares in nominal output, (1 -e)and,respectively.
Consider first the change in after—taxwage income for the workers in
firm i, The workers in that firm mustpay- = —(1-o)(T-T)/Kof
lump sum taxes to finance the revenue subsidy, where —r1is the tax on the
workers of firm i, Tt —T0is the subsidy (the negative tax on the revenues of
firms), both expressed as deviations from their levels in astationary
equilibrium,and K is the number of firms.12 So their total after-taxincome,








To obtain an expression for total lump sum taxes,we aggregate the expression
for the subsidies paid to firms (12) and simplify13
-T=E(T —T')=PY(p+v)
Given the Cobb Douglas production technology, the share of laborincome in the
stationary economy is given by (1 -e)=(WL)/(py).The tax which the
-19—labor force in firm i pays is therefore
(1 —)(T —T) WL
.1 1 t0 00 11
0 K
=-i + Vt) =_W0L0(Pt
+Vt)
Wageincome for the workers of firm i,exclusive of the tax, isobtained by
substituting the demand for labor (14) andthe wage indexation rule (11 )into
iiiiii ii
W L WL=WL (w + tt 00 00 t
toyield
(1 -) - b(1 -e) (1-) - b(1 -
W1L1—W1L'=W1L1 1]p + [
2
Jv1}.(36)
tt00 O0 0 -t 0





N-N1=W1L1[(——HPt + + vj
Sinceat the optimum b1+ =1,the coefficient of tin(37)isequal to
unity. Thus, after—tax wage incomeis fully indexed to the pricelevel.14
Wage indexation itself overcompensateSworkers for a rise in the price level,
but the taxlevied to payfor the subsidy to firms reduces net wageincome so
that itrisesin proportion to prices.
We now show that the tax used to financethe subsidy to firms restores
aggregate wage income and profits totheir levels in the benchmark economy.
We demonstrate this result only for wageincome, since this together with
profits exhausts nominal output. Aggregateafter-tax wage income is obtained
by aggregating N-N1in(37)overK firms. This yields
K
N -N = (N1-N1) t0 t 0 i=1
1 —(b+ )(1 —) (1 —)
—(1
—
= WL + - +v 1.(38)
0OL Bt 3
1ti
—20—At the optimum, given by (32a)—(32c),we find
N -N WLTp +I'—------'lv. (38') t 0Oo& t '1÷nO ti
Wage income in the frictionless
economy is obtained by substituting (8a) and
(8c) into the following expression
W*L* —WL =WL w* + tt00oOltt
1 +n =WL {p* +
(—Jv} 00t1+nOt
Since = aslong as output is identical in the twoeconomies, the after-
tax wage income in thecontract economy is identical to the tax-freewage
income in the benchmark economy.
Although aggregate after-tax income matches that inthe benchmark
economy, the labor force in each firm does not receive thesame income,
inclusive of taxes, as in the benchmarkeconomy. Likewise, the income of each
owner of a firm differs in the two economies. Soin order to achieve the same
consumption pattern as in the benchmarkeconomy, we must assume that total
consumptionby labor (or owners) is independentof the distribution of income
withinthat class.15 By designing the taxes inthis way, the government
avoids affecting the incentives of the individualfirms in responding to firm—
specific disturbances.
6. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have analyzedwage contracts in an economy with firm—
specific productivity disturbances. In thecase where the disturbance is
known to all relevant agents we haveconsidered two alternative schemes which
achieve the same equilibri as in thecompetitive frictionless economy. The
first is a privately negotiatedwage indexation rule which ties wages in each
—21—firm to the overall price level, as well asthe firm-specific productivity
disturbance. -The indexation rule, whichis analogous to Karni'S rule for an
aggregate economy, involves fullindexation to prices and partial indexation
to the productivity disturbance. Secondly, wehave proposed a taxation scheme
to accompany a simpler form of wageindexation tying wages to prices alone and
have shown how this too can achieve the same objective.The tax, levied on a
firm's revenue with a tax credit for labor use,modifies the firm's response
to the productivity disturbance, inducingthe firm to produce the same output
as in the benchmark economy. The optimalindexatiorl scheme is a partial one
and depends upon just two parameters:(i) the supply elasticity of labor, and
(ii) the elasticity of labor in the productionfunction. The tax rate depends
upon the same two parameters.
In the case where the productivity disturbanceis known to the firm
alone, we have shown that the firm has anincentive to misrepresent current
conditions. When taxes are combined with firm—specific wageindexation,
however, the incentive for the firm to cheatis eliminated. The tax must take
the form of a revenue subsidy to firms financed by a lumpsum tax shared by
labor and firms in proportion to their contributionto total output. As
stated at the outset, our analysis does not explainthe absence of complete
markets or why the government through this tax schemehas an advantage in
making privately-negotiated contracts incentive—compatible.It may well be
the case that a purely private contract can fulfillthe same role. We leave
such an investigation for future research.
As a final point we may note that the results wehave obtained can be
interpreted as applying either to a closed economy or an openeconomy under
purchasing power parity. The results are virtuallyunchanged in the case of
an open economy in which domestic and foreign goodsare distinct. In the
—22—latter case the same degree of indexatiori isapplied to the CPI,ratherthan
to the domestic price level.
—23—FOOTNOTES
* Anearlier version of this paper was presented to the NBERSummer
Institute,August 1984. We would like to thank Joshua A.izenman,Matthew
Canzoneri, Jacob Frenkel, Robert Hodrick, Charles Plosser,Asaf Razin,
and an anonymous referee for helpful comments and suggestions.
1. Aizenman (1983) and Aizenman and Frenkel (1983)follow a different course
by analyzing indexation in economies where prices arecurrently
observable, but output is not. They show that indexation caneliminate
all variations in output relative to the full informationcompetitive
economy except those due to disturbancesunforecastable on the basis of
current information.
2Several studies have investigated implicit labor contractsfor the case
where firms have an informational advantage. (See, for example,
Azariadis and Stiglitz, 1983, and the papers cited there).
3. Of course (2) holds exactly, rather than as only afirst order
approximation, if all lower case letters are interpreted aslogarithms.
Working with percentage changes makes aggregation simpler.
4.It would be even more preferable to model explicitlythe costs associated
with short-run mobility, although this would complicatethe analysis
considerably.
5. A competitive equilibrium would be attainable in africtionless economy
without contract lags if the disturbances were common to asubset of
firms within which labor was mobile even within the period(such as firms
within a particular geographic area), as long as that subsetis large
enough to ensure competitive labor market behavior.
6. McCallum and Whitaker (1979) analyze the stabilizingeffects of an income
taxwhichacts as a built-in stabilizer for aggregate output. Although
—24—our tax also acts as a built—in stabilizer, it is leviedon the revenue
of firms-rather than on income, and thereforemodifies supply rather than
demand behavior. Because it affects thesupply behavior of firms, it is
able to undo the distorting effects of the laborcontracts on the output
of individual firms.
7.Indexatiorito the productivity disturbance can bethought of as a bonus
scheme.Bonuses tied to the firm!s performance arequite common practice
in countries such as Japan as well as inspecific industries in the
UnitedStates, such as investment banking. Bonus schemes,however, are
typically asymmetric in not penalizing workers in badyears.
8. The above argument establishes that thetaxation—indexation scheme
succeeds in replicating output in the benchmarkeconomy. Using the same
argument as that developed in Section 5 below we can show thatby an
appropriate lump sum rebate of the tax we are able to restoreaggregate
wage income and profits to their respective levels in the benchmark
economy.
9. Barro (1977) and Fischer (1977) discussproblems of moral hazard arising
when fir are aware of real disturbances, but laboris not.
10. For a discussion of incentive—compatibility ina general context, see
Myerson (1979).
11. In the case of a negative productivityshock, (30) measures losses. In
this case to minimize losses the firm will havean incentive to reveal
the productivitydecrease and to index wages or pay taxesaccordingly.
12. Recallthat sinceT representsa subsidy, Tt <0.
13. Equation(34)isderived as follows. Combining equations(2) and(12),
i I i i T —T=(PY )(p +v) t 000 t t
—25—Summing over the K firms, and noting thatY1 and v =z v,we
obtain (34).
14. The subsidy to firms is equal to zero instationary equilibrium,T1 =0,
so N1 =W1L1.(To show that T10, evaluate T1 in (A.1) at t =0,where
000 0 t
by assumption P0 =1.)If the productivity disturbances are equal to
zero (v =v
=0),equation (37) simplifies to
(N -N')/N
=Pt
15.If indifference curves are homothetic, the totalconsumption of labor
will be independent of the distribution among thelabor forces of
individual firms.
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—27—Appendix:
In this appendix, the expressions
(12)—(14) for the contract economy are
derived.
Consider the following expression
for the tax levied on firm i, expressed
in terms of the levels of outputand other variableS:a
i i i 1— i (1—)
Tt = (Lt)
,0< < 1 . (A.1)
As noted in the text, this is atax on gross revenue, with acredit for the
employment of labor. If welinearize this expression by taking afirst—order
(Taylor series) approximation1 weobtain:
i i I 1— i 1— 1 1—0
T-T=P(L )[p+ y I- (P)(L
t 00 0 t t 0 0
(A.2)
[(1 - +y) ÷ (1 -
Assumingthat by choice of units, P0 =1,and noting that by (ii)
= we can express taxes as a percentageof gross revenue as
follows:
T1-T t o 1 1 1
_____= Pt+ -[(1




Thisis equation (12) of the text.




The first—order approximation ofthis expression is
i i 1— il—8
i i
Rt —R=(P)(L) [(1 — + + —
(A.5)
—W1L1(+ w)
-28—Given the Cobb-Douglas productionfunction, we know that
- iiWL00=1-
S py00
so dividing (A.5) by p y1 we obtain 00
t 0 1 + + 8(1 - - (1-e)(w+ py00
which is equation (13) in thetext.
Finally, writing (A.4) as
i
• (l—8)v
R =pl_8(L1)1_Se WL , (A.7)
and differentiating withrespect to L, yields the first-orderCondition for
the firm:
(1- )v1
(1 —e)P8(L) e = . (A.8)
The first-order approximation forthis expression is
i i (
whichby rearrangement is just (14) in thetext.
aThe standardwageindexatjon scheme which we adopt in thispaper has an analogouslevel form:
w =____
withthe indexatjon parameter, b,entering as a geometric weight.
—29—Current Equilibnum Values in Benchmark Economy:
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